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24 environmental economics. This study builds upon the literature by providing 
25 subjects with  individual and social energy  performance  information  at  group 
26 level in a controlled field experiment setting. We aim to test whether extrinsic 
27 incentives accentuate or crowd out the intrinsic motivation to save energy and 
28 how  heterogeneity  in  environmental  attitudes  also  impacts  on  electricity 
29 conservation. Besides, we test for the persistence of energy-saving habits after 
30 the information is removed. Results suggest that the provision of individual 
31 feedback and social information increase energy conserving behavior, with this 
32 being most effective among those who signaled in a previous stage  preferences 
33 for  pro-environmental  and  sustainable  living.  However,  treatment variations 
34 indicate that subjects overall fail to maintain “good habits” once the intervention 
35 stops, with exception of pro-environmental subjects who continue to consume 
36 less electricity in the post-intervention phase. Furthermore, our findings indicate 
37 that rewarding groups in a competitive environment may create perverse long-run 
38 effects. While providing individual and social information could improve both 
39 consumer welfare and energy demand forecasting, the timescale, frequency, and 
40 mechanism undertaken require careful scrutiny and planning if these potential 
41 benefits are to be maximized and undesirable side effects prevented. 
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48 Improving the efficiency of domestic energy consumption has become a showpiece 
49 of how behavioral economics can be applied to the field of environmental econom- 
50 ics. The use of behavioral “nudges,” which are non-price interventions grounded in 
51 psychology and behavioral economics, has been proven to be an effective tool that 
52 improves consumption awareness and instill positive environmental habits (Allcott  
53 2011; Kunreuther and Weber 2014). 
54 Student residences in a UK university campus could be a good setting for 
55 assessing the effectiveness of such nudging. One reason is that students are relatively 
56 unfamiliar with understanding their patterns of energy usage as compared with the 
57 average   population; hence, they are more receptive to behavioral adaptation. 
58 Moreover, the rent of student residences is typically predefined and inclusive of 
59 utility bills. This means that throughout the study trial, no financial advantages are 
60 made (by the participant) if the students become more energy-efficient. It could 
61 be  assumed  that  any  behavioral  change  stems  from  an  intrinsically motivated 
62 response to the imposed treatment. 
JEL Classifications 
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63 In our experimental study, we nudge students to be more energy-efficient by 
64 providing them with information about their electricity consumption. Specifically, 
65 students were informed of their absolute (i.e., individual information) and relative to 
66 others’ (i.e., social information) energy usage via a weekly email between January 
67 and May 2017. The study explores whether (a) individual feedback and social 
68 information creates a fall in consumption per se, (b) conservation behavior persists 
69 once the information stimulus is removed, and (c) the introduction of an extrinsic 
70 motivation in a form of rewards heightens or offsets the desire to make energy 
71 savings. 
72 Our results imply, and in line with relevant literature, that a small (4–8 percentage 
73 points)  yet  significant  reductions  can  arise  when  subjects  are  provided  with 
74 individual and social comparative energy consumption information. In fact, treated 
75 students exhibited a decrease in their energy consumption from an above-average 
76 consumption to a below-average one relative to their building-level cohort. When 
77 exploring the second and third research questions, the study identifies some novel 
78 insights which are potentially useful from both a social and policy-based standpoint. 
79 Regarding the persistence of conservation behavior, it seems that most subjects 
80 quickly  lose  any  “good  habits”   (and  return  to  pretreatment  levels  of  energy 
81 consumption) once the email intervention ceases and the information stimuli are 
82 removed. Interestingly, this pattern is not seen among students who self-signaled as 
83 environmentally friendly  in  a previous  stage  prior  to  this  study. They not only 
84 decrease their consumption during the intervention period but also continue to 
85 exhibit lower levels of energy usage in the post-intervention period. Regarding 
86 extrinsic motives, the added incentive to win a prize appears to accentuate energy 
87 conservation behavior. However, once the prize allocations are determined, these 
88 conservation habits come to a halt, and subjects within this sub-treatment group 
89 exhibit significantly higher energy usage in the post-intervention phase. 
90 These findings therefore issue a mixed message for the energy policy field. On the 
91 one hand, the results show that providing individual and social information can 
92 constitute an effective environmental nudge and lead to efficiency gains. However, 
93 the time frame and type of mechanism employed require careful planning if one is 
94 seeking  to  optimize  societal  benefits  and  indeed  if  unwanted  (or  inefficient) 
95 consumption patterns are to be avoided in the long run. 
96 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section “Background of the Study” 
97 outlines   the   literature   on   environmental   nudging   in   the   energy   sector; 
98 Section “Experimental Design and Procedures” describes the study experimental 
99 design and procedures; Section “Behavioural Predictions” presents the behavioral 
100    predictions; Section “Analysis and Results” provides the results and associated data 
101     analyses; Section “Discussion” proceeds with some further discussion; and section 
102    “Conclusion” concludes and recommends some future steps for research and policy 
103 in the field. 
4 M. Brock and N. Borzino 
 
104 Background of the Study 
 
105 
106    Research has shown that people on suboptimal energy tariffs are not persuaded to act 
107     even when provided with information on the possible financial savings they  could 
108    make by switching to a more convenient deal offered by the same or another service 
109    provider (Giulietti et al. 2005). Domestic energy constitutes around 27% of the UK’s 
110     demand  for  fuel  (DECC  2015),  wherein  associated  savings  derived  from  the 
111     improved awareness on energy consumption could be substantial both for individ- 
112  uals and at aggregate levels. Research also indicates that many people overconsume 
113    energy and the only dissemination of the advantages of energy efficiency rarely 
114    results in any significant behavioral adaptation. False perceptions play a major 
115     role here, where users could hold untrue or incorrect weighted ideas on the relative 
116    energy requirements of domestic appliances (Attari et al. 2010; Allcott 2011a). The 
117    impact of this  is that  individuals  often  undertake  “energy-saving  behavior” that 
118    creates financial savings that fall short of their expectations (HM Government 
119    2006). Undoubtedly, the introduction of personal energy usage interfaces and the 
120    associated move to make these freely available (www.smartenergygb.org) could 
121    combat this effect. However, it is important to highlight that uptake is voluntary 
122    and thus the likelihood of a self-stimulated action is projected to be less extensive in 
123 consumer areas where widespread disengagement exists. 
124 The combination of effects mentioned above, which contributes to the deteriora- 
125    tion of energy conservation, has created an intense research field seeking to establish 
126    whether behavioral economics and psychology can successfully address people’s 
127    unwillingness to act (Abrahamse et al. 2005; Allcott and Mullainathan 2010; Croson 
128    and Treich 2014). The studies also assess the relative success of using alternative 
129 tools to engage consumers in a more pro-environmental behavior. 
130 In this sense, “nudges” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009) have been shown to be 
131    a successful tool to influence decision-making in diverse settings, including the 
132    energy sector (see, for example, Abrahamse et al. 2005; Allcott and Mullainathan 
133    2010; and Croson and Treich 2014). A leading mechanism used by behavioral 
134    economists is to test the role of social comparisons (Bault et al. 2008; Allcott 
135    2011b; Czajkowski  et al. 2014;  Dasgupta  et  al. 2016). The  associated  theory  is 
136    that people tend to react oversensitively to their performance or status relative to 
137 their peers. Thus, explicitly showing individuals how they perform in comparison to 
138    their  peers  could  increase  levels  of  energy  efficiency  leading  to  reductions in 
139    consumption and improving of their energy standing. These social comparisons 
140    have been implemented in many ways. Popular techniques have fused percentile 
141    statistics with a diagrammatic trigger, for example, a happy or sad face (Allcott 
142    2011b) or “green stars” (Costa and Kahn 2013). The belief is that the latter element 
143     reinforces  comparative  performance.  Other  studies  provide  an  explicit ranking 
144    breakdown, which illustrate precisely where a subject lies in relation to their peers 
145     (Delmas and Lessem 2014; Alberts et al. 2016). The results from these studies  are 
146     encouraging,  implying  energy  consumption  can  fall  by  a  magnitude  between 
147     0   and   10   percentage   points   (Allcott   2011b;   Delmas   and   Lessem  2014). 
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148     Gains  from  nudging  have  been  even  greater  in  other  areas  of  environmental 
149    economics, including the promotion of recycling and reduction of food wastage 
150 (Convery et al. 2007; Kallbekken and Sælen 2013). 
151 Studies have typically believed that the greatest reductions arise from the initially 
152    poor  performers,  although  counterarguments  have  also  been  reported  in recent 
153    studies. Indeed, social comparisons may create a “discouragement effect” which 
154    disincentivizes weaker participants (Hargreaves et al. 2013; Alberts et al. 2016) 
155     under certain conditions. On the other hand, Delmas and Lessem (2014) concluded 
156    from  their  study  that  alongside  incentivizing  the  worst  performers,  relative 
157  information also heightens the efficiency of already high performers. They attribute 
158    this to such respondents wanting to maintain a high status. This in turn defies the 
159     “Jevons paradox”  (Alcott 2005), which would predict that as one is identified as a 
160    relatively strong performer, one should react by raising their energy consumption. 
161     This heterogeneity implies that  “targeted” dissemination (regarding both how  the 
162    information is presented and to whom) could be crucial when seeking to ensure 
163    environmental gains can be made from such an intervention (Allcott and Rogers 
164 2014; Alberts et al. 2016). 
165 A difficult aspect within this type of research is to unravel the motives that drive 
166     an  individual’s  behavioral  change.  This  is  particularly  tasking  because energy 
167     efficiency provides a “win-win” situation for the environment and the agents given 
168    that, by decreasing their electricity consumption, it also produces (at times substan- 
169    tial) financial private gains (Kallbekken and Sælen 2013). Consequently, energy 
170 conservation  contains attributes akin  to an impure  public  good  (see, for example, 
171    Kotchen  2009),  and  so  disentangling  the  effects  produced  by  the  stimuli, and 
172 determining the incentives that influence decision-making, is a tall order. 
173 Using student accommodation in a controlled field experiment does partially 
174    alleviate this problem (Delmas and Lessem 2014; Alberts et al. 2016) as most 
175    university residences offer rental contracts that are inclusive of utility bills. More- 
176    over, prices are set prior to residency and remain fixed throughout tenancy, which 
177    eliminates any financial advantages to students in relations to the amount of energy 
178  they consume. Thus, if adjustments in energy usage are witnessed once subjects are 
179    provided with performance information, this gives a clearer indication that actions 
180     are driven by an intrinsic desire to improve their standing or to act pro-socially. In 
181 this respect, the study setting is “cleaner.” Furthermore, there is evidence that in this 
182    context, subjects are typically more receptive to behavioral adaptation (Giuliano and 
183    Spilimbergo 2009). This is one of the reasons why some experimenters believe 
184     student  cohorts  are  less  representative  of  the  wider  population  although some 
185     existing  studies  prove  otherwise  (Druckman  and  Kam  2009).  Nonetheless, we 
186    apply an air of caution regarding the extent to which any findings could be fully 
187    applicable to a wider population. This is one motive for offering a subset of students 
188    the opportunity to win a prize in this study. By doing so, their consumption levels are 
189 compared with others within the trial to further explore the motivational conundrum 
190    exhibited  by  students.  We  could  also  potentially  provide  findings  that  may be 
191    applicable to the domestic residential market where both intrinsic and extrinsic 
192 incentives exist. 
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193 This project also builds upon the existing literature in other domains. The first is 
194    that  information is provided  to groups  of respondents  who  share  a living  space 
195    (hereon in referred to as “flats”). Findings from both laboratory and field experi- 
196    ments indicate that groups exhibit stronger tendencies for pro-social action than 
197 when people act as individuals (Mancur Olson 1965; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Frank 
198     2003). This pattern is observed across public good games, voluntary actions, waste 
199    reduction, and environmental affiliation. The notion is also supported by the sub- 
200     jective  well-being  literature,  stating  that  “interconnectivity” and  feeling  part of 
201    something bigger than oneself instill a stronger societal construct and level of 
202     psychological  happiness  (Putnam  and  Alone  1995;  Diener  and Biswas-Diener 
203    2011). This in turn facilitates  instances  of altruism  (Andreoni  1990),  reciprocity 
204    (Sugden 1984), or positive social action (Czajkowski et al. 2014). Alternatively, it 
205     could be argued that groups could bring about greater energy conservation through 
206 the competitive atmosphere it imposes. Indeed, when presented as a “team,” respon- 
207    dents frequently react more fiercely in order to improve their standing relative to 
208    rival groups (Terry et al. 1999; Baik 2008; Konrad 2009; Nitzan and Ueda 2009). 
209    Regardless of the disposition that motivates them, disseminating information to a 
210  group seeks to understand if (and to what extent) this adjusts the scale of behavioral 
211 change. 
212 In  this  study,  we  also  attempts  to  understand  whether  and  how  those who 
213    indicated to be committed to an environment of sustainable living react to compar- 
214    ative  information.  Therefore,  we  seek  to  explore  to  which  extent self-reported 
215    positive environmental attitudes are also reflected in actual energy-efficient perfor- 
216    mance.  Past  literature  shows  evidence  of  a  positive  relationship  between self- 
217    reported pro-environmental habits and concrete eco-efficient actions (see for exam- 
218 ple Urdiales et al. 2016). 
219 To test this, we analyze the behavior of a subset of our treatment flats, which are 
220    part of a long-standing movement at the university, known as “The Green Flats 
221    Project.” These students, when completing their accommodation application  form, 
222     indicated  their  preference   to  reside   with  other   people  that   share   the  same 
223    pro-environmental attitudes and also wish to live in a sustainable way. Including 
224    this treatment affords the chance to study whether “Green Flat” residents (i) hold 
225    “below-average” baseline usage prior to information dissemination, (ii) are more or 
226    less responsive to  the  comparison data, and (iii)  display  a different  consumption 
227 trajectory across the study period. 
228 We also want to study how extrinsic motivations could affect the behavior of 
229    participants. To analyze this, around half of the treatment flats enter into a compe- 
230    tition for prizes, with the winners being those flats who consume the least energy per 
231    student during the intervention period. The literature here suggests two possible 
232    impacts from implementing this treatment. On one hand, contests typically create 
233    incentives for an overprovision of effort relative to the socially optimal level. Such 
234  “over-dissipation” (Konrad 2009) is accentuated in experimental settings, where the 
235     extent to which respondents engage in the contest consistently exceeds the  thresh- 
236    olds predicted by theory (Davis and Reilly 1998). This is exacerbated in instances 
237    where prizes are distributed proportionally (Cason et al. 2010), or when the prize 
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238    quality is high (Doraszelski and Markovich 2007), there is a heightened “desire to 
239    win” (Lugovskyy et al. 2010) and when we see a greater degree of homogeneity 
240    among contestants (Clark and Riis 1998; Baik 2008). In contrary, opposing literature 
241  shows empirical and experimental examples (Bergstrom et al. 1986; Pellerano et al. 
242     2017) where such extrinsic incentives offset (or “crowd out”) the innate or intrinsic 
243 motive  to  act  in  a  pro-social  way.  Based  on  this  crowding-out  literature,  it  is 
244     suggested that  paying people  for an activity  may help  in the short run but reduce 
245    their intrinsic motivation to perform the task in the long run once the incentives are 
246    removed. An overview of the evidence surrounding this area is provided by Cerasoli 
247     et al. (2014), and it is certainly an aspect that is both interesting and highly policy- 
248 relevant to consider. 
249 Finally, there is often disagreement in this research domain as to how persistent 
250    habits are once a “nudge” is removed. For associated policy, understanding the long- 
251   term benefits of an intervention is crucial for forecasting the impact(s) and estimating 
252    the financial outlay required in order to achieve a successful outcome. Existing 
253    evidence in this domain varies, with some studies suggesting that behavioral habits 
254     can partially persist into medium to long term (Abrahamse et al. 2005; Allcott and 
255    Rogers 2014), while others indicate that pro-social actions quickly dissipates once 
256    the  intervention  disappears  (Dolan  and  Metcalfe  2013).  Intrinsically motivated 
257 individuals tend to persist longer in pro-social actions, principally because by acting 
258 in that way, they get reinforced their self-image and status (Cerasoli et al. 2014). 
259 To  test this,  we stop sending emails to a subset  of our student groups  halfway 
260    through the trial period. Half of those subset of students were part of the “Green Flats 
261    Project,” while the other half were not. By comparing their consumption against 
262    those who obtain the ranking email for the whole intervention time frame, the 
263 question on habit persistence can be further explored. 
264 By imposing these new elements onto an existing research framework, this study 
265    looks not only to confirm and reinforce some of the current beliefs on how non- 
266 financial stimuli can incentivize behavioral change but also to examine how such an 
267    action might be influenced by facets of persistence, extrinsic motivation, and  prior 
268 attitudes toward sustainability. 
 
 
269 Experimental Design and Procedures 
 
270    The experiment ran between January and May 2017 at the University of East Anglia 
271    (UEA),  Norwich,  UK. Fourteen  flats  were  selected for  the study  that  involved 
272    140 students. An overview of the flats and their attributes is given in Table 1. Before 
273    the trial began, participants were informed that the energy they used in residences 
274    would be logged and that this (anonymized) data would be sent to them through a 
275    weekly email. This would show their absolute usage and how this is compared to the 
276    other residences which partook in the study. It was made explicitly clear that relative 
277 efficiency would not lead to a change in accommodation fees. 
278 Including the “Green Flats” afforded a unique opportunity to see if those who 
279    signaled a preexisting preference for a pro-environmental lifestyle deviated from the 
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280    main cohort. Possible differences could be anticipated in relation to the general 
281    (base) usage or how individuals and comparative information influenced energy 
282    performance. While the “Green Flats Project” has existed at the UEA for a number of 
283 years, no direct obligation or onus is placed upon the students regarding sustainabil- 
284 ity when they live in the flat through the academic year. 
285 In order to test the role of persistence, four of the flats in the study would (without 
286    warning) stop receiving the emails, yet their usage continued to be logged and 
287    ranked. The monitoring of energy usage also continued beyond the information 
288    dissemination  period  for  all flats, in  what  is  later  described in  the  results  and 
289     discussion  sections  as  the  “post-intervention”  time  frame.  Table  2  shows that 
290    following 10 weeks of emails, the Spring Semester was bisected with 4 weeks of 
291    an Easter break. Students returned, and for a period of 6 weeks, the monitoring 
292     continued.  However,  email  communications  stopped  after   4  of  these   weeks, 
293  affording a chance to see if (short-run) habits persisted in the absence of a reminder 
294    for the remaining ten flats. For the four flats mentioned above, emails stopped in 
295 week 8 of the timeline given in Table 2. 
296 When exploring the role of the extrinsic motivation, the selection of the prize had 
297    to be chosen carefully. Instead of offering direct monetary incentives, the prizes 
298    students were competing for including (i) a three-course meal and drinks at one of the 
299    on-campus restaurants and (ii) lunch vouchers for the same establishment. These 
300    prizes present positive advantages. Firstly, given that readings were taken at group 
301 level, it reinforced an idea of cohesion within flats, which brings about the notion of 
302    working as a team and being rewarded in the same way. Secondly, this prize was 
303 perceived as something that students would value with greater equity than monetary 
304 equivalents given the diversity in the students’ financial backgrounds. 
305 Each flat was fitted with a monitor that isolated, logged, and stored energy usage 
306     data. Meter readings were taken at the same time of each week, and students  were 
Flat name Number of students Email stopped after 6 weeks Green Prize 
AA17 12   ✓ 
BB17 8 ✓ ✓  
CC17 10   ✓ 
DD17 10   ✓ 
EE17 10 ✓   
FF17 10 ✓   
GG17 10  ✓ ✓ 
HH17 10   ✓ 
II17 11  ✓ ✓ 
JJ17 11 ✓ ✓  
KK17 11    
LL17 9   ✓ 
MM17 9   ✓ 
















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
Pretrial Semester Part 1 (email sent) Easter (emails not sent) Semester Part 2 (email sent) Posttreatment (emails not sent) 
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Rank Team Usage 
1 BB17 10.56 
2 NN17 11.16 
3 HH17 15.49 
4 KK17 15.55 
5 GG17 16.97 
6 MM17 18.00 
7 CC17 18.44 
8 EE17 18.78 
9 LL17 19.93 
10 FF17 21.94 
11 DD17 22.31 
12 II17 23.55 
13 JJ17 25.55 
14 AA17 26.81 
 
Rank Team Usage 
1 BB17 917.63 
2 HH17 1182.96 
3 MM17 1236.00 
4 NN17 1300.90 
5 GG17 1306.33 
6 KK17 1351.52 
7 EE17 1472.60 
8 CC17 1598.00 
9 DD17 1720.00 
10 LL17 1761.65 
11 FF17 1764.80 
12 AA17 2374.04 
13 II17 2402.80 



















Energy Monitoring Research Project 
Week 8 
Your Flat Code DD17 
 
This Week Running Total Weekly Performance 
 
 
To opt out at any time, email michael.brock@uea.ac.uk 
 
Fig. 1 A sample email 
 
307    emailed on the following day of each week. Figure 1 shows that information was 
308    disseminated to students through three tables. One showed weekly usage and the 
309    associated rankings across all competing groups. A second gave the same informa- 
310    tion for overall usage and ranking since the beginning of the intervention period. The 
311 final table provided a “ranking timeline” for the course of the trial period. 
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312 Behavioral Predictions 
 
313    In this section, we present our behavioral predictions that are derived from the 
314    relevant literature reviewed in section “Background of the Study” and motivate 
315    our   experimental   design   described   in   section   “Experimental   Design   and 
316  Procedures”. In this study, and as discussed previously, we are interested to analyze 
317    the  effect  of  individual  and  social  information  on  electricity  consumption and 
318    whether there is a persistent effect of that information once the feedbacks are 
319 removed.  Furthermore,  we  aim  to  study  whether and  in  which  extent  extrinsic 
320    incentives have an effect on energy conservation. Lastly, we want to analyze whether 
321  subjects who self-signaled to have a pro-conservation or “green” identity respond in 
322    a greater magnitude to the information compared to those who did not identify 
323 themselves as being environmentally friendly. 
 
 
324 Role of Information 
 
325 H1: Students receiving individual and comparative feedback increase energy 
326 conservation. 
327 This hypothesis is built on the notion that receiving both individual and social 
328    information in the form of a league table will stimulate efforts to lower per-student 
329     usage  over  time.  This  is  grounded  in  the  notion  that  the  league  table incites 
330    competitive tendencies and a desire for flats to improve their relative standing in 
331 the league. 
 
 
332 Role of Persistence 
 
333 H2: Those who stop receiving feedbacks increase their electricity consumption as 
334 compared with those who keep receiving information. 
335 This second hypothesis follows the notion that the students in flats where the 
336    email stopped halfway through the trial are likely to have a higher energy usage than 
337 those who continue to receive emails. At the very least, we would expect the former 
338    group to be returning to prior intervention levels as they revert to their original habits 
339    in  the  absence  of  individual  and  social energy information.  This  provides  one 
340 measure of persistence. 
 
 
341 Role of Prizes 
 
342 H3a: The existence of extrinsic incentives will increase conservation efforts. 
343 H3b: Once the rewards are given, subjects return to the pretrial level of 
344 consumption. 
345 This is the conjecture that extrinsic rewards stimulate respondents in the “prize” 
346    treatment to reduce energy usage to a greater extent. A related hypothesis is that this 
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347    group will adjust their consumption more rapidly over time in their desire to win the 
348    prize than those who are in the “non-prize” group. However, once the prizes are 
349  given at the end of the intervention period, subjects do not maintain their low levels 
350     of consumptions, but return quickly to their baseline level of energy usage. Indeed, 
351    extrinsic incentives may work in the short term but might reduce the intrinsic 




354 Role of Green Identity 
 
355   H4a: Self-signaled pro-environmentally friendly individuals react stronger to the 
356    feedbacks by reducing the electricity consumption more than the nonself-identified 
357 “green” subjects. 
358 H4b: Self-signaled pro-environmentally friendly individuals persist in their conser- 
359 vation habits after the feedbacks are removed. 
360 The first hypothesis revolves around the idea that students who have expressed 
361    prior preferences to act sustainably will have a lower energy usage on average as 
362 compared to those who have not made this commitment. If this effect is accentuated 
363    by reputation, we would also expect the gap between these two groups to widen 
364    overtime during the intervention period. Furthermore, we expect these subjects to 
365    maintain their good  habits even  after  the  information  is removed.  Indeed,  once 
366    individuals experience the positive aspects of being more energy-efficient, their 
367    positive self-image and status improve reinforcing their intrinsic motivation for 
368    behaving pro-environmentally. This will further encourage them to maintain their 
369 conservation habits even after the intervention period is over. 
 
 
370 Analysis and Results 
 
371    In this section, we are presenting the results from our analysis over aggregate and 
372    heterogeneous behaviors using uniquely generated experimental data. Our research 
373     questions  are  addressed  in  the  subsections  below,  and  accordingly,  we assess 
374 whether our results validate or reject our behavioral predictions. 
 
 
375 The Role of Information 
 
376    One of the major aims of this research was to identify whether the provision of 
377    energy information impacted upon subsequent behavior. In order to assess this usage 
378     against that of those students not in the study, the University Estates Division  was 
379    able to provide aggregated monthly energy usage for the associated residential 
380     buildings  covering the study period. These buildings  comprise entirely  of student 
381    accommodation, meaning the two data-sets are comparable across the experiment’s 
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*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 
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Building Treatment 
 
Fig. 2 Comparing treatment flat and building usages 
 
382 time frame. The results identify a clear pattern of energy conservation behavior for 
383 the treatment groups relative to the “building-level” baseline. 
 
384 Table 3 and Fig. 2 confirm that students living in the treatment flats consumed 
385    more than the average level from within their respective buildings during the initial 
386    phase  of  the  study.  However,  the  identified  gap  significantly  erodes overtime. 
387    Indeed, after approximately 2 months of disseminating information through emails, the 
388   average electricity consumption of treated flats is lower compared with others within 
389    their  respective  buildings,  validating H1.  This  means  that, and as hypothesized, 
390    dissemination of individual and social information in a form of league table incites 
391    the competitive spirit in our subjects increasing their conservation efforts. The 
392    magnitude  of  this  effect  is  consistent  with  previously  cited  field  research and 
393    indicates the potential gains that could be derived by raising the visibility of energy 
394    usage via social comparisons. This reinforces the positive contribution that behav- 
395    ioral  interventions  could play  in facilitating  tangible adaptations in  how  people 
396     behave.  While  this  trend  is  aligned  to  previous  works  conducted  at  the same 




Average weekly usage 







January 19.65 20.47 + 4.14** 2.43 (0.01) 
February 20.38 20.93 + 2.69* 1.63 (0.051) 
March 16.07 15.74 — 2.03* —1.3 (0.09) 
April 12.75 12.55 +1.64 —0.079 (0.21) 
May 13.99 14.36 +2.64* 1.47 (0.07) 
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Variables Log weekly usage per student 
No email stop Ref 







Number of number of teams 14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***p <0.01, **p <0.05, * p <0.1 
 
 
397 university (Brock 2016), this is still something that could be highly prioritized in 
398 future work to affirm the robustness of this result. 
399 Although only a crude measure of persistence, the fall in efficiency between April 
400    and May serves as an initial warning about how subjects respond to information over 
401  time and how this relates to their behavior. Emails stopped in early May, and by the 
402    end of the month, the average usage of energy among the treatment flats return to 
403  above the building level (although not fully returning to the pre-intervention dispar- 
404    ity). Two possible conjectures arise from this. The first is that good habits may erode 
405  quickly once  a nudge  is no longer  explicitly  imposed  upon  individuals  – this  is 
406    something that shall be considered further in the next subsection. The other is that by 
407     the time students were exposed to many weeks of emails, the novelty or interest in 
408    the project disappears. Both of these conjectures hold a strong policy relevance and 
409  indicate that extreme care needs to be paid to the frequency, format, and timeline of 
410 delivering such information in order to maximize and retain user engagement. 
 
 
411 The Level of Persistence 
 
412    Figure 2 implies that there may be some questions regarding how long-lasting an 
413 information stimulant may be. As shown in Table 1, we test this aspect by including 
414    a subset of flats who stopped receiving emails after a period of just 6 weeks. 
415    Nonetheless,  these  flats’ readings  were  still  taken  for the  full 22  weeks  of the 
416    study allowing their usage patterns to still be seen for a full 3 months after the 
417 email termination date. 
418 Table 4 confirms that no significant differences occurred between the two treat- 
419    ment groups, which in principle gives us little support for H2. However, upon closer 
420    inspection, it appears that this result may have been driven by the wide heterogeneity 
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Fig. 4 Comparing ranking trends between those receiving emails for only 6 weeks against those 
receiving emails for the full study period 
 
421    in the performances of the four “6-week” sub-treatment flats. Exemplified  through 
422    Fig. 3, we see that Flat “BB17” was an extremely strong performer (hence low 
423     ranking) throughout the study period, perhaps because this group already acquired 
424    preexisting energy efficiency habits and constantly practices them. For both Figs. 4.2 
425     and 4.3, the crucial stage is Week 8, which was the time emails stopped for the “6- 
426     week” groups. With the exception of Flat “JJ17,” Fig. 3 shows an apparent upward 
427     trend (and thus worsening rank) following this period. When aggregated in Fig.  4, 
428 this seems most pronounced in the initial weeks after the email stopped. 
429 Furthermore, when inspecting Fig. 4, it is noteworthy to look at the slight increase 
430    in the rankings of those within the “full information” treatment after week 19. This is 
431    the time when the information disseminating emails stopped. The trends seen in 
432    weeks 9–11 for our “6-week subsample’ and in weeks 19–21 for the remaining 
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Number of number of teams 14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1 
 
 
433 groups imply that it is the immediate time period after stopping an information 
434 interjection that creates the most severe reactions in behavior. 
435 University accommodation contracts ceased from “week 22,” which explains 
436    why further monitoring did not occur. However, assessing these patterns in future 
437    work could be easily achieved by simply bringing forward the treatment start date or 
438    by using a set of subjects (e.g., postgraduate students or domestic residents) who live 
439 in their accommodation for a full calendar cycle. 
 
 
440 The Impact of Offering a Prize 
 
441    Another key aim is to see what impact (if any) extrinsic incentives have on the 
442 subjects’ decrease of their energy consumption. As previously stated, two strands of 
443    competing literature exist here. The first argues that the added competition should 
444    heighten the desire to improve one’s standing, leading to an even greater reduction in 
445    energy consumed. However, an opposing (theoretical and experimental) literature 
446    shows evidence that extrinsic motivations can offset (or “crowd out”) intrinsic 
447 desires or motivation of pro-environmental behavior. 
448 The results of this study are mixed. Table 5 observed no significant differences in 
449    energy consumption. This result arises when formal econometric testing is used to 
450    compare those in the “prize” versus “non-prize” treatment groups. This suggests that 
451  the opportunity to reap additional extrinsic benefits through a strong relative perfor- 
452 mance does not translate into greater instances of energy-saving behavior. 
453 However, by delving a little deeper, a couple of interesting and policy-relevant 
454 patterns emerge from those flats who were given the chance to win a prize. 
455 The first of these results arises if we segment the results into three stages: before, 
456    during, and after the intervention period. Table 6 provides the average consumption 
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457    for the two groups across these periods. It shows us that within the “pre-interven- 
458    tion” phase, those in the “prize” treatment group consumed on average 23.9% more 
459     energy each week than those in the “non-prize”  treatment. This means the “prize” 
460 subsample were relatively poor performers at the time the emailing began. 
461 However,  the  gap  not  only  shrunk  but  reversed  through  the  intervention 
462     period wherein the “prize” treatment groups consumed a marginally lower level of 
463    energy on average per week than the remaining set of participants. The difference 
464  (0.07KwH) is marginal and statistically insignificant, but given the pre-intervention 
465    consumption  levels,  this  implies  that  the  potential  for  additional  reward could 
466    represent some form of stimulus to respondents. This result validates our H3a. 
467     Indeed,  as  it  was  anticipated,  the  existence  of  an  extrinsic  motivation makes 
468     “prize”  groups to make an extra effort in their electricity conservation. Regarding 
469  the  post-intervention  figures, we  see the  levels  of energy usage  from the  “prize” 
470     groups almost return to their pre-intervention threshold. Yet  the magnitude of  this 
471    return is by no means as substantial as for the “non-prize” cohort, suggesting that 
472 perhaps there are some lasting effects from the extrinsic prize. 
473 While this first effect seems promising, a second finding reveals that in the post- 
474     intervention  period,  the  average  usage  of  the  “Prize” subsample  rose  by 22% 
475    compared with the final week when emails were sent. Combined with statistics in 
476     Table 6, this implies that the “prize” flats exhibited a more pronounced  downward 
477    trajectory in usage during the intervention period itself than “non-prize” counter- 
478    parts. However, a rapid rise in the energy consumption was observed once prizes had 
479    been allocated, which validates our H3b. For individuals that are extremely com- 
480    petitive, this makes intuitive sense. Through the intervention period, they are likely 
481    to be very conscious of the amount of energy they were using, particularly in the 
482    weeks prior to the selection of the winning teams because of their strong desire to 
483  claim  a prize. However, once  the prizes  were  allocated,  the strong impulse  to be 
484    energy-efficient disappears, leading them to quickly reverting back to a pattern of 
485 higher usage. It is noteworthy to highlight that this post-intervention pattern was not 
486    witnessed for flats within the “non-prize” treatment. This result is consistent with the 
487     “crowding-out” literature, which suggests that extrinsic incentives may work in the 
488    short   term   but   might   reduce   the   intrinsic   motivation   to   perform   the 
489 pro-environmental action once the incentives are removed. 
490 Informal evidence of this is given in Fig. 5. This illustrates the ranking of the 
491    leading “prize” flats over the duration of the study. Note that winners were deter- 
492    mined by week 17. The graph shows that the four leading flats in the prize treatment 
 Pre-intervention usage 
(KwH/week) 






14.99 (5.59) 16.85 (6.96) 14.22 (4.21) 
Non-prize 
cohort 
12.1 (3.76) 16.92 (6.89) 14.03 (5.68) 
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Fig. 5 Ranks of the leading contenders in the prize treatment 
 









493     had maintained a steady rank throughout  the intervention period but these quickly 
494    rose (meaning they were now performing relatively badly) once the announcement is 
495    made. When considering the design and nature of implementing some form of 
496    extrinsic motivation, this type of result is undoubtedly poignant for policy-makers 
497    and energy providers alike, particularly if their objective is to improve the long-term 
498 consumption and stability of energy demand.  
 
 
499 The Impact of Residing in a Green Flat 
 
500     One of the novel elements of this study is its ability to have a subset of the subject 
501    pool from a “Green Flat.” Recall that these participants expressed a desire, far before 
502    the study begins, to live in an environmentally sustainable setting. It offers an 
503    opportunity to examine whether they have a lower level of energy usage and, of 
504    equal interest, whether they respond differently when are presented with individual 
505 and social information. 
506 A really surprising result here is that “Green Flats”  residents actually consume 
507    more energy than those in standard residencies during the “pre-intervention” phase. 
 Pre-intervention usage 
(KwH/week) 














508  Table 7 confirms this point, showing that Green Flat occupants on average consume 
509    29% more energy each week than their peers. This finding echoes previous exper- 
510    imental  work  (Brock  2016) and  seems to  indicate  that  in the  context of energy 
511     consumption, there is a clear discourse between the intentions of a person and their 
512     behavior in the absence of a mechanism for them to monitor or uphold their stated 
513 ambitions. 
514 Nevertheless, this trend of overconsumption disappears over the intervention 
515 period and significantly reverses by the time the post-intervention period is reached. 
516    These two results validate our H4a and H4b. As we expected, these subjects react 
517  positively to the information disseminated and maintain their good habits even after 
518     the  information  is  removed.  Unfortunately,  we  have  no  way  of disentangling 
519    whether this occurs because of the information channels in themselves or instead 
520  through a desire to defend a previously stated reputation. In any case, this finding is 
521    intriguing, especially for one who is looking to design techniques that will get 
522 consumers committing to longer-term pro-social activity. 
523 The trends in Table 7 offer a second insight that is observed from the green flat 
524    treatment groups. In just the same way as with the post-intervention consumption 
525    patterns  of  “prize” respondents,  the  average  consumption  of  those  living  in 
526    Non-Green Flats increases by 19.1% relative to the final weeks where the interven- 
527    tion took place. However, for the Green Flats over this same period, there is a 
528  continued fall in usage by an average magnitude of 23%. Linking this finding to the 
529    notions of behavioral habits and persistence, this offers the conjecture that long-term 
530    energy conservation habits may only materialize if an individual expressed a pre- 





533    While these results are encouraging and complement findings of previous studies, 
534    we acknowledge that they could be significantly strengthened through repeated tests 
535    to check for their reliability and robustness. Furthermore, to do so with a larger 
536    cohort  would  be  also  very  valuable.  Nonetheless,  this  work  contributes  to the 
537    literature by assessing experimentally the roles of persistence, extrinsic motivation, 
538 and attitudes to sustainability on energy consumption. 
539 It appears that the degree to which “good behavior” persists is highly dependent 
540    upon a range of factors, including prior attitudes of those receiving the information 
541    or the way in which an intervention interacts with other motives, be these extrinsic or 
542    intrinsic. With these intricacies put aside for one moment, it is clear that there are 
543    clearly potential advantages for gathering and disseminating information on energy 
544    usage. Our results imply that savings from imposing a competitive framework could 
545    offer a 5–10 percentage point reduction in energy consumption over a fairly short 
546    period of time. On aggregation, this could be translated into significant financial 
547    savings by making domestic energy users more sustainable. Moreover, this could 
548    also  benefit energy suppliers  through  the establishment of   more  consistent  and 
549 predictable trends in energy demand. 
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550 Nevertheless, a significant heterogeneous response arises through this study, 
551    which suggests that policy-makers need to identify and seize opportunities to target 
552    information to the various population groups that share similar characteristics. This 
553    is something that the energy industry is already aware of through aforementioned 
554    studies in relation to performance (Abrahamse et al. 2005), political ideology (Costa 
555 and Kahn 2013), and demographic status (Giulietti et al. 2005). However, this study 
556    explicitly demonstrates this, considering how both prizes and “green” individuals 




559     This  study  builds  upon  a  burgeoning  literature  that  seeks  to  identify whether 
560    relatively cost-free behavioral nudging can influence people’s energy consumption. 
561     To test this, students living in student residences at a UK university were provided 
562    with (absolute and relative) energy usage data through a weekly email. The study 
563    introduced new insights, firstly by issuing energy information at a flat (apartment) 
564    level and secondly by splitting this cohort to explore aspects relating to extrinsic 
565   motivation, persistent behavior, and preexisting environmental attitudes. This sought 
566 to  assess  (a)  whether  responses  differ  when  data  is  provided  through  a  group 
567    dynamic and (b) whether these imposed subtreatments create a range of consumption 
568 trends as a consequence. 
569 The results imply that issuing ranking information can incite behavioral change. 
570    The treated flats involved in the study reduced their usage by a magnitude which 
571 make  them  jump  from  an  above-average  consumption  to  a  below-average  one 
572    relative to their building-level cohort. Interestingly, students in the “Green Flats” 
573     proved to be good performers through the intervention period. This result suggests 
574    that those students have a greater positive response to individual and comparative 
575    performance information with respect to non-“Green Flats” students. Importantly, 
576    this effect persists over time in the post-intervention even when the information is 
577 removed. 
578 While no evidence hints toward the crowding out effect of extrinsic motivations 
579    on intrinsic ones, there are serious questions regarding the long-term impact of 
580    offering such additional reward, particularly from the point after a promised incen- 
581     tive is issued. Finally, “good consumption habits”  seem to erode quickly for those 
582    who receive the prize, and at multiple junctures in the study, an almost immediate 
583    upward trajectory in consumption is observed once emails ceased and information is 
584 removed. 
585 These findings appear highly relevant for the field of energy and environmental 
586    economics. We advocate extending and expanding upon these experimental  begin- 
587    nings in order to strengthen the evidence for these early conjectures. The main 
588    implication is that policymakers, industries, and consumers alike must consider the 
589   role of nonfinancial stimuli in inciting small and yet significant changes to behavior. 
590     A motivation to change may exist, yet how long does this desire remains is  highly 
591    debatable. Moreover, this project implies that the success of an intervention may 
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592    crucially hinge on the way that it is imposed. This relates both to its frequency and its 
593   target group’s characteristics (i.e., demographic, socioeconomic, and psychological). 
594    It suggests that an ability to nurture (or indeed even establish) a desire for behavioral 
595    change in an environmental field such as energy usage will require a well-crafted and 
596 thoroughly planned scheme if the anticipated benefits are to fully materialize. 
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